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At this distance in time from the events of 1864 it
is not possible to prepare a satisfactorily complete picture of the 1864 Federal campaign in East Florida. Basic
for such a study is the extended series of orders and reports of Federal and Confederate general officers and
unit commanders preserved in the War of the Rebel&m:
Official Records of the Uwio~~ and Confederate Armies,
Series I, Volume XXXV, Parts 1 and 2,1891 (page numbers in these volumes are hereafter cited in parentheses).
A careful consideration of these leads to the conclusion
that many gaps exist in the series. Despite this deficiency, the available reports record the observations and
opinions of participants, contemporaneously written,
when recollection of events was fresh and vivid. The
other sources are limited in number, among which are
the reports of correspondents in The Rebellion Record
(Moore, 1861-1868). and the Woodford letters (Bornet,
1949, see herewith in appendix). The Confederate accounts of the battle of Olustee are more specific in their
relation of the disposition and movements of their various units than are those of the Federal. This is attributable to the extemporaneous character of the action,
the brief Federal occupation of an unfamiliar field and
confusion of an unexpected battle, so that the successive
positions of their units are not so closely identifiable.
CONCEPTION

OF THE

CAMPAIGN

On December 15, 1863, Major General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South of the
Federal Army, with headquarters at Hilton Head, South
Carolina, proposed certain operations in Florida to
Major General H. A. Halleck, General in Chief, with the
objec.t of recovering the most valuable part of the state,
The QuarterZ2/ is grateful to the Florida State Board of Par& and
Historic Monuments for assistance in the publication of this article.
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cutting off supplies for the Confederacy, and the recruiting of Negro troops. According to Davis (1913, see appendix) it appears not unlikely that the idea of these operations may have been suggested to General Gillmore by
L. D. Stickney, a resident of St. Augustine, who held
the office of Federal Tax Commissioner in Florida. He
was well-known to Gillmore. It is certain that Stickney
was absent from his post on a journey North late in 1863,
and circumsta.nces strongly indicate that he had been
in personal contact with Gillmore at some time during
this period. This is corroborated by a statement made
by Seymour to Gillmore on February 11, 1864 (282).
While in Washington, Stickney had solicited of President Lincoln the dispatch of a large military force into
the state. On December 8th, Lincoln had issued his amnesty proclamation, announcing reconstruction plans for
the South. Shortly after Stickney’s return to St. Augustine, a petition signed by many Union men praying for
armed occupation of Florida, was submitted to Lincoln.
With national elections not far distant, Lincoln may or
may not have considered these proposals from the standpoint of practical expediency. It might appear that an
awareness that sueh considerations were receiving careful attention in high political circles, determined the acquiescence expressed in Halleck’s subsequent letters. On
December 22, Halleck replied to Gillmore, stating that
he was authorized by the Secretary of War to say that
Gillmore was at liberty to undertake such operations in
his department as he might deem best, providing that
he secure the positions he held before Charleston. About
one month later, on January 14 (278), Gillmore advised
Halleck of his early intention to occupy the tvest bank
of the St. Johns river. That the project of Stickney, as
well as Gillmore’s proposal had come to the attention of
the White House, is reasonably certain, for on January
13, 1864, President Lincoln made the unusual move of
directly writing to Gillmore, expressing .knowledge of an
effort to establish a loyal state government in Florida,
and soliciting Gillmore’s aid in furtherance of recon-
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struction within range of the late proclamation (278).
Later, on the 22, Halleck (279) informed Gillmore that
the Secretary states that the matter is left to the judgment and discretion of Gillmore with the means at his
command. He further stated that as the object of the expedition had not been explained, judgment on its advantages or practicability could not be formed. However,
the opinion was expressed that the proposed military
operations would exert little or no influence on the progress of the war. This evoked from Gillmore, on January
31 (279), a statement giving as his objectives, the following :
1. Procuring an outlet for the products of the state;
2. Cut off the enemy’s source of commissary supplies ;
3. Secure recruits for colored regiments; and
4. Inaugurate measures for the restoration of Florida to allegiance in accordance with the desires of the
President.
In the meantime, movement of the Federal fleet during the middle of January reported to General G. T.
Beauregard, Commanding the Confederate Department
of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, had aroused
apprehensions that some new offensive operations were
contemplated, and on the 16th he repaired to Savannah,
where he remained until February 3; when, convinced
that no movement of his opponent to that quarter was
imminent, he returned to Charleston, leaving orders for
certain units to be alerted for possible early service in
Florida. This was later expressed in a letter to General
Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector of the Confederate States Army, on March 25, 1864 (321).
THE FEDERAL EXPEDITION

Although having received a green light from his superiors for his project, Gillmore did not act on his authorization until February 4, when, apparent’ly with a high
degree of secrecy, he issued an order to Brigadier General Truman Seymour, commanding the District of HilPublished by STARS, 1950
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ton Head, for the embarkation of certain units of Seymour’s command then at St. Helena Island, South Carolina, and Fort Pulaski, Georgia, to board transports and
get to sea before daylight on the 6th (280). This affected
the following units, viz.:
Col. Wm. B. Barton’s Col. James Montgom- Cal. Guy V. Henry’s
Mounted Brigade :
Brigade :
cry’s Colored Brig40th Massachusetts?
7th Connecticut*
ade (472) :
7th New Hampshire
2nd South Carolina* Massachusetts Cavalry, Independent Bat8th United S tat es, 3rd United States?
Colored?
talionf
54th Nassachusetts
Battery M, 1st US Artillery, 4 pieces?
Battery B, 1st US Artillery, 4 pieces?
James’ Rhode Island
Battery, 1 section,
2 pieces?

These orders appear to have been quickly extended
to include the 47th, the 48th, and the 115th New York
regiments, then at Fort Pulaski. These were to be limited
to two wagons for each infantry regiment, and one for
each mounted company. The men were to be provided
with 60 rounds of ammunition. On departure, General
Gillmore himself accompanied the expeditionary force
and one may suspect that even Seymour did not know
their destination or objectives before they were at sea.
On arrival in Florida, changes were made in the assignments of units to the various brigades, through the promotion of Colonel J. R. Hawley of the 7th Connecticut
to the command of the brigade previously commanded
by Barton, the latter (colonel of the 48th New York),
being given command of a new brigade formed from the
New York regiments.
T HE

F EDERAL A DVANCE

The expedition proceeded under a naval escort provided by Admiral J. A. Dahlgren and reached the mouth
of the St. Johns river on the morning of February 7.
Indication of the secrecy of the undertaking is afforded
by the circumstances that news of the project only
* On January 31 stationed at St. Helena (463)
t On January 31 stationed at Fort Pulaski (463)
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reached the Federal blockading force off the river mouth
with the arrival of an officer from Gillmore’s staff on the
previous day (476). The advance of the transports with
an escort of naval vessels up the river was unopposed,
except for the firing of a Confederate picket into one
of the transports (295). On their approach to Jacksonville, the Confederates sunk their steamer, Xt. Marys, in
MeGirt’s creek, and burned 276 bales of cotton (231). A
company of the Massachusetts Independent Cavalry was
quickly landed to pursue the Confederate pickets. Some
of the transports experienced difficulty in crossing the
bar at the river’s mouth, and were delayed in reaching
the wharves, so that disembarkation was not completed
until noon of the 8th.
On the afternoon of the 8th, believing that the Confederates might make a stand at Camp Finegan, the command was moved westward from Jacksonville, Colonel
Henry’s brigade forming the extreme right, Colonel Barton’s the center, and Colonel Hawley’s the left (296). On
the same night Henry’s brigade rode rapidly ahead,
reaching Camp Finegan, eight miles distant, when the
Confederate force was retiring for the night. This con:
sisted of about 350 men under Lt. Col, A. H. McCormick.
Despite the surprise, McCormick succeeded in withdrawing his force (281, 330). The infantry coming up, went
into camp that night in Camp Finegan but Henry’s force
continued, and three miles further, at 12 mile station
(Picket’s house or Camp Cooper) captured four guns of
the Milton Light Artillery, which were being readied for
removal by train (336). Continuing to push on during
the night, Henry’s force occupied Baldwin at sunrise on
the 9th, without encountering resistance. Here they captured another gun, and supplies to an estimated value
of $500,000.00. On the 9th, the infantry went. as far as
Camp Cooper, where they remained until the following
day, when they continued on into Baldwin (Woodford
in Bornet). Woodford described Baldwin as consisting
of a depot, tavern, half a dozen shanties, three railroads
a.nd a rail fence.
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Although Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, commanding the District of East. Florida, said that as soon
as learning of the landing on the 7th he advised McCormick to guard against surprise (330), the latter does
not appear to have profited therefrom. It might be expected, owing to his closer proximity to Jacksonville,
t,hat he would have known of the landing before word
reached Finegan, and would have kept on the alert without caution from his superior. Finegan advised Beauregard of the Federal landing on the 8th. Beauregard instructed General Gilmer to send to Finegan the forces
from Savannah previously ordered held in readiness
(111). General Gardner, commanding the District of iMiddle Florida, was told to send Finegan every man he could
spare. General Colquitt’s brigade, with a light battery,
was ordered from James’ Island to entrain for Savannah. No sooner had the latter order been given, than a
Federal movement on James ’ Island on the lOth, believed
to be diversionary in character, necessitated the retention of Colquitt with three and one half regiments. This
movement was soon repulsed and Colquitt and his force
were permitted to continue to Florida (111, 112). Other
troops were sent from positions around Charleston, Savannah, and on the Savannah railroad. What appeared
to be another Federal diversionary movement on Whitemarsh Island near Savannah, obliged Beauregard to retain two of the regiments destined for Florida, one of
which was later released. Arrival of these reinforcements
was retarded by the lack of rolling stock on the Georgia
and Florida railroads, and the circumstances that these
lines were not in connection, the troops being obliged to
march some 26 miles across the gap between Lawton (Du
Pont), Georgia, and Live Oak (323), requiring two days
time (334). Others are said to have marched from Valdosta to Madison (Jones, 1867). Despite these difficulties, the celerity with which Beauregard assembled an
adequate defensive force, is surprising.
Encouraged by the lack of resistance, Henry was
ordered to continue his advance to the west. He reached
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the ford of the south fork of the St. Marys river at Barber’s plantation on the IOth, where he was opposed by
a small force, variously stated as 150 infantry (281), or
two companies of dismounted cavalry (296), As a consequence of this brush, Seymour inconsistently reported
Henry’s casualties as 25 in one instance (281), or three
killed and ten wounded in another. (296). Barbers was
described as a house, barn, three shanties, two rail fences
and a creek (Woodford in Bornet). Finegan stated (325)
that this advance was opposed by Major Robert Harrison with two companies of the 2nd Florida Cavalry (331))
who were marching from Camp Cooper to Lake City.
The Confederate losses were placed at two killed and
two wounded. Finegan had ordered Bonaud’s Battery,
with infantry and all available cavalry up to the west
side of the ford to keep the enemy in cheek as far as possible, a move which they apparently were unable to effect,
as Henry’s force, unopposed, reached Sanderson at 6
P. M. the same day (281). Confederate stores at this
point had been removed on the previous day, with the
exception of 1500 bushels of corn which were set afire
before Henry’s arrival. On the llth, part of Hawley’s
brigade (7th Connecticut), in light marching order, followed Henry’s command, reaching Sanderson after dark,
where they spent a miserable night, unprotected in a rain.
Sanderson is described by Woodford as c.onsisting of a.
depot, tavern, and one or two houses.
By the Ilth, Finegan had collected at Lake City,
principally from Middle Florida, 490 infantry, 110 cavalry, and two pieces of artillery, which on the night of the
10th were placed in a favorable position about two and a
half miles east of Lake City (331). Henry’s command
spent the night of the 10th at Sanderson, and on the 11th
Seymour reported to Gillmore they would go as far as
Lhey could with sa.fety toward Lake City (252). Finegall
states this force, estimated at 1400 mounted men, appeared before his hasty works at Lake City about 10
A. M. (331, 325), dismounted and skirmished with his
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force for several hours until they had felt out his works1
and artillery, whereupon they retired toward Sanderson (331). Finegan reported the repulse of the enemy
at Lake City to Beauregard (111). Seymour also reported
to Gillmore on the llth, that the 115th New York was already at St. Marys, and that the 47th, the 48th New York,
and the 7th New Hampshire, with two guns, were on
their way there from Baldwin. Gillmore had, on the llth,
advised Seymour to hold Sanderson, but not to risk a
repulse by an advance on La.ke City. He stated further
that eight companies of the 54th Massachusetts were ordered on to Baldwin (282). Seymour meanwhile advised
Gillmore that the command had left for Sanderson (283).
On the 12th he reported that he had ordered Henry to
fall back to Sanderson (282). He expressed the opinion
that Sanderson could not be fortified, and that he would
withdraw to the St. Marys as soon as Henry returned
from the Lake City reconnaissance (283). He further
stated that he would send out a regiment to meet Henry.
On the 12th, Gillmore ordered Seymour to concentrate
his command at Baldwin, as word had been received of
a mounted force near Callahan which might trouble his
right flank. Coincident with Henry’s return to Sanderson, the whole force at that point fell back to the position on the St. Marys (Barbers) on the 13th, where during the subsequent week the men were actively occupied
in fatigue duty, building huts, and drilling. Seymour told
Gillmore on the 13th, that withdrawal from the St. Marys
would make another advance impossible. Seymour did
not comply with Gillmore’s order to return to Baldwin.
On the 13th, a detachment of Col. Henry’s force was
ordered to make a raid on Gainesville (479), in order
to capture two trains. The assignment was carried out
by a detail of 50 men from the 40th Massachusetts, who
departed from Sanderson (296). This force had a brush
1. Tradition at Lake City locates these trenches of Finegan’s as extending on a northeast-southwest line from the vicinity of Rig
(Alligator) Lake to the vicinity of the pond at Waterton, an
abandoned sawmill site. Their line is crossed by 135 90, east of
Lake City, somewhat west of where this highway crosses the
tracks of the Georgia Southern and Florida Railway.
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with two companies under Captain Dickison at Gainesville on the 14th, with unrevealed casualties. They returned on the 17th. The raid appears to have been unproductive.
Another raiding party was dispatched to Callahan
on the 14th. They made a forced march and destroyed
the railroad and bridges there without encountering any
opposition.
Subsequent to the skirmish of the llth, Finegan
advanced his force to Olustee, a village thirteen miles
east of Lake City, in order to occupy what he regarded
as the only strong position between Lake City and the
St. Marys (331). Entrenchments were begun, and the
position was occupied on the night of the 13th, with 1800
infantry, 450 cavalry, and two batteries and one section
of artillery (336). He expressed some apprehension over
the possibility of a flanking movement by the enemy’s
cavalry, which would permit. a descent on the Suwanee
river bridge at Columbus, where he had only 30 men
(326). On the same day he reported that he had been
rejoined at Lake City by Lieut. Col. McCormick and neariy all the men who had been routed from Camp Finegan
on the night of the 8th (324).
Gillmore remained in Florida until the 13th. On his
departure that part of the State of Florida comprised
in the limits of the Department of the South, was, on the
15th, constituted as the District of Florida, under Seymour’s command (481). During his stay in Florida, Gillmore issued a series of orders to Seymour which gradually curtailed the scope of the operations, while Seymour
declared opinions widely at variance with previous expressions, mainly about the attainment. of the earlier
avowed objectives of the expedition and the practicability
of the contemplated operations. Thus on the lOth, Gillmore had ordered Seymour to push forward as far as
he could toward the Suwanee river (473), which appears
to have been the original objective of the operations
carried on in the days immediately following disembarkation. Yet as early as the following day, Seymour pessi-
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mistically expressed to Gillmore the opinion that in the
present condition of transportation (without a servicable locomotive), a movement on Lake City is not admissable, and that what has been said of the desire of the
Floridians to come back is a delusion. He then further
stated that the backbone of rebeldom is not here, and
that Florida will not cast its lot until more important
successes elsewhere are assured; He advised that the
force be withdrawn from the interior and that Jacksonville and Palatka alone be held. He further freely expressed critical opinions of the soundness of the strategy
of the campaign, and apprehensions and forebodings
which were singularly prophetic (282). Gillmore may
have been impressed by these representations, as on the
12th, as already noted, he indicated a desire to have Seymour’s command concentrated at Baldwin (283). Seymour expressed a remonstrance to this order on the 13th.
by the statement that a withdrawal from the south fork
of the St. Marys would make another advance impossible
(284). Gillmore appears to have accepted this view of
Seymour’s, as he later stated (on the 18th), that his last
instructions were for Seymour to hold Baldwin and the
St. Marys’south fork as the outposts to the west of Jaeksonville and to occupy Palatka and Magnolia on the St.
Johns (285). On the 15th, Seymour (482) advised Gillmore that he was bringing further units up to Baldwin,
and would move on that date. Two days later (17th) he
wrote a surprisingly ambiguous letter to the following
effect: He stated that lack of a locomotive had compelled
him to remain at a point where his command could be
fed, as not enough supplies could be accumulated to permit execution of his intention to adva.nce to the Suwanee
river. But now he proposed to go on without supplies,
even if compelled to retrace his steps to secure them,
with the object of destroying the railroad near the Suwanee. He said that all troops had been moved up to
Barbers and probably by the time Gillmore received his
letter he would be in motion in advance of this point.
He requested a demonstration by Federal forces in the
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Savannah river, in order to prevent the reinforcement
of the enemy on his front by troops from Savannah (284).
Seymour’s letter appears to have reaehed Gillmore at
Hilton Head on the following day (l&h), who in a reply
of that date expressed great pertubation from the conflicting views expressed. He pointed out the impossibility of effecting the desired naval demonstration in the
Savannah river simultaneous with Seymour’s forward
movement owing to delays inevitably necessary in securing the naval collaboration, even should Admiral Dahlgren be disposed to acceed to the proposal. Gillmore
called to Seymour’s attention that the latter’s proposals
ignored instructions Gillmore had given, and their inconsistency with opinions which Seymour had previously
expressed, and reiterated the instructions last given
(285). In order to lend emphasis to his points, he made
his Chief of Staff, Brigadier General J. W. Turner, bearer of the reply, who, owing to bad weather, did not reach
Jacksonville until Seymour had fought and lost at Olustee. In a letter to Turner, written on the 22nd, Seymour
stated that his movement had been entirely and fully
in accordance with his views of the designs expressed
to him by Gillmore, modified, as was his right, by personal presence and command. The letter continued further in a defensive vein not necessary to notice (287).
The official records do not reveal whether Seymour’s
decision to advance on the 20th was an independent resolution, or reached in council with his staff. However,
Hawley (Battles and Leaders), states that Seymour, a
night or two before the battle, called six or eight of his
officers into a consultation at Baldwin, in which opposition to a forward movement was expressed.
During the week subsequent to February 13, Finegan, at Camp Beauregard near Olustee, was reinforced
by various units from Georgia and South Carolina, sent
by General Beauregard, which permitted him to organize
his command as follows :
First Brigade, under Brigadier General A. H. Colquitt :
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6th
19th
23rd
27th
28th
6th

Georgia, Colonel Loftin
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia, Colonel Zachry
Georgia, Captain Crawford
Florida Battalion Infantry, Major Pickens
Bird
Chatham Artillery (four pieces) Captain
John F. Wheaton
Sedond Brigade, under Colonel George P. Harrison:
32nd Georgia (Cal. Harrison), Major W. T. Holland
64th Georgia (Cal. J. W. Evans) Captain C, S.
Jenkins
1st Georgia Regulars, Captain H. A. Cannon
Major A. Bonaud’s Battalion
1st Florida Battalion, Lieut. Colonel C. F. Hopkins
Georgia Light. Battery, Captain John M.
Guerard
Reserves :
Florida (Leon) Light Artillery, Captain
Robert H. Gamble
Cavalry, under Colonel Caraway Smith:
4th Georgia Cavalry, Colonel Duncan L. Clinch
2nd Florida Cavalry, (Cal. Caraway Smith)
Lieut. Colonel A. H. McCormick
By the 2Oth, Finegan stated that his effective force
comprised 4,600 infantry ; less than 500 cavalry ; artillery in three batteries with twelve guns (331). As in the
case of several Federal units, it is likely that some at
least of these regiments were skeleton units, probably
averaging not over 500 men each.
Delays incident to the passage on foot of the railroad gap between Lawton and Live Oak, according to
Beauregard, prevented arrival of further reinforcements
until after the 20th (334),
Seymour advised Gillmore on the 16th that he had
called up to Baldwin the 7th Connecticut, the 47th New
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York, and the 3rd U. S. Colored regiments, and expected
to bring up the 7th New Hampshire at once. He further
stated his intention of moving forward (to Barbers) that
day (482). On the 17th he advised Gillmore of the following disposition of the units under his command in the
District of Florida (284, 288) :
On garrison or occupation duty10th Connecticut, eighth companies at St. Augustine, two companies at Picolata. Occupation of Palatka
and Magnolia deferred.
Colonel Guss, Fort Clinch, Fernandina, with six
companies in constant motion.
24th Massachusetts, Baldwin
55th Massachusetts, Baldwin
2nd South Carolina, Colored
3rd U. S. Colored
At Camp Shaw (late Finegan) for instruction and
organiaation1st North Carolina, Colored. At Baldwin, except
for three companies sent to Barbers. (This unit, however,
participated in the action at Olustee, with Montgomery’s
Brigade).
Operating forceColonel W. B. Barton’s Brigade :
47th New York, Colonel H. Moore
48th New York (Cal. W. B. Barton) Major W. B,
Cone
115th New York, Colonel J. Sammon
Colonel J. R: Hawley’s Brigade :
7th Connecticut (Col. J. R. Hawley) Captain
Skinner
7th New Hampshire, Colonel J. C. Abbott
8th U. S. Colored, Colonel C. W. Fribley
Colonel James Montgomery’s Brigade :
1st North Carolina, Colored, Lieut. Col. W. N,
Reed
54th Massachusetts, Colored, Colonel E. N. Hallowell
Colonel G. V, Henry’s Mounted Brigade:
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40th Massachusetts Mounted Infantry
Independent Massachusetts Cavalry, Major
Stevens ’ Battalion
Battery B, 1st 13. S. Artillery (4 pieces)
(Elder’s Horse Battery)
Artillery, Captain John Hamilton (assigned to
Montgomery’s Brigade)
Battery E, 3rd U. S. Artillery (6 pieces}
Captain Hamilton
Battery M, 1st U. S. Artillery (4 pieces) Captain Loomis Langdon
Section James’ Rhode Island Battery (2
pieces) Lie&. Eddy
Not much is known of the numerical strength of
these regiments, although it is probable none were at full
strength. Data are only available for those of Hawley’s
Brigade, of which the 7th New Hampshire had 30 officers
and 675 men, the 8th U. S., 21 and 544, and the 7th Connecticut, 10 and 365. The latter was so depleted by the
absence of men on furlough that for the campaign it was
temporarily organized into 4 companies.
Nothing in the surviving documents indicates that
anything significant occurred in either of the contending
forces on the 18th, although on this and the following day
Seymour was probably occupied in bringing his operating force up to Barbers (the south fork of the St. Marys
river). On the evening of the 19th Seymour ordered his
command to be in readiness for an early forward movement on the morrow, and to be provided with several
days supply of cooked rations (298). This order appears
to reflect a decision based on information he received
that night, the nature of which he did not disclose to his
staff (Moore, a). On the Confederate side, Engineer
Lieutenant M: B. Grant, began construction of trenches2
in front of Camp Beauregard at Olustee on the 19th
(339). On the same date Beauregard relayed to Cooper,
2. Until recent years, the line of Grant’s trenches could be seen
along the eastern edge of the village of Olustee. A trace of this
line is still visible between US highway 90 and the railroad track.
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Finegan’s opinion that he had at least ten regiments on
his front. Beauregard expressed the opinion that it was
essential to have an officer accustomed to handle troops
in immediate command in Florida, and proposed to send
down General Taliaferro, as the section was too large
and vital to be lost (112).
T HE B ATTLE

OF

O LUSTEE

OR

O CEAN P OND

The morning of Saturday, February 20, 1864, was
a.s fine as any Florida has seen. At 6 A. M. General Seymour set his force, consisting of 5,500 officers and men,
with sixteen guns, in motion westward from Barbers
(ZSS), on a road roughly parallel with the railroad. Colonel Henry’s Mounted Brigade, including Elder’s Battery (B), lead the advance. It was followed by Colonel
Hawley’s Brigade, which left at, 7 A. M., to which Hamilton’s Battery (E) was attached. The battery took the
road, the regiments marching by the flanks abreast, the
7th New Hampshire and the 7th Connecticut to the right
of the road, the 8th U. S. Colored to the left (303). They
were followed by Colonel Barton’s Brigade, with Langdon’s Battery (M), and the section of the Rhode Island
Battery (Eddy’s), marching in column. Colonel Montgomery’s Brigade, which was in charge of the wagon
train, did not get away until 8 :30 A. $1. (315). Henry’s
command soon outdistanced the marching columns. The
absence of flankers was noted by one of the corresponda.nts (Moore, a), and another states that much of the
artillery was not shotted and the guns of whole companies were unloaded (b).
Surgeon Majors relates (299) that passing Sanderson about noon, Seymour was informed that the Confederates would be met in force some miles east of Lake
City, but no reliance was placed on what was regarded
as dubious information regarding strength and position.
Before reaching Sanderson, Seymour, however, had ordered the 7th Connecticut to take to the road and proceed
in advance of the rest of the brigade. Later it was ordered
to keep one half mile in advance, which distance was
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maintained until they were about three miles (four or
six miles according to correspondants (Moore, b, G, d)
beyond Sanderson, where they came upon Henry’s command, which had ha.lted when they came upon five mounted Confederate pickets, who were stationed at an old mill
to the left (Moore, a). This, according to a correspondant, was at 2 P. M., but according to Seymour, was about
3 P. M. At this point the road, which had for some distance followed a course to the south of the railroad,
crossed the latter to the north side to avoid a swamp.
The force is stated to have been formed at Sanderson
into three columns (Moore, b, c). Seymour ordered two
companies of the 7th Connecticut of Hawley’s Brigade
to be thrown forward as .skirmishers, one on either side
of the railroad, the other two companies being kept to
the rear as reserves. These companies were armed with
Spencer repeating rifles. They soon came up with the
Confederate advance guard of 60 to 70 skirmishers, who
gave w&y and were followed about three miles, exchanging a few, shots (307). In the meanwhile, the advance
cavalry and the 7th Connecticut skirmishers reported
that they suspected the Confederates in force were directly in front. Seymour halted his command, and sent
Elder’s Battery to the front on the north of the railroad,
and opened fire to disclose the Confederate position. A
reply in kind was soon received from the Confederates,
the first shells passing close to where Seymour’s staff
was standing.
Finegan, (331) in disagreement with the Federal
chronology, stated that at 12 M., the Federal army, advancing in three columns, having formed a third after
crossing the branch where the roads fork, was within
three miles of his position, with a force estimated at 8,000
infantry and 1,400 cavalry. In the morning, he had ordered the 4th Georgia Cavalry and the 2nd Florida Cavalry, Colonel Smith commanding, supported by the 64fh
Georgia and two companies of the 32nd Georgia under
Colonel Evans, to advance and skirmish with the Federal
force and draw them to the Confederate works. Smith
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reported (352) that he found the Federal forces about
four miles east of Olustee, occupying the second crossing
of the road and railroad. Clinch’s force was dismounted
to skirmish, but the enemy advancing, they retreated to
their horses and withdrew, keeping the enemy in check.
On reaching the first crossing he found Colquitt’s force
already drawn up. Colquitt ordered Smith’s cavalry to
take places on the flanks, Clinch to the left, McCormick
to the right. The 64th Georgia had been posted early at
this crossing of the road and railroad, two and one quarter miles east of Olustee, as support for Smith. General
Finegan prepared his remaining force for action, Apprehensive that the enemy might be too cautious to approach
his works at the village, he directed General Colquitt to
assume command and advance with three regiments (the
6th, 19th and 28th Georgia), and the First Florida Battery (Major Gamble), and feel out his opponent by skirmishing, and if not in too heavy a force, to press him
heavily. Colquitt took up a position south of the railroad, just to the rear of the 64th. This wa.s at 3 P. M.
Under a brisk fire from the 7th Connecticut, then approaching in skirmish line, the 19th Georgia was placed
on the right, the 28th Georgia on the left, with Gamble’s
Artillery between, all south of the railroad. The fire of
the Spencers in Federal hands, produced some confusion
in the 64th Georgia (Jones, 1867). Affairs to this point
constitute the first position later described by Lieutenant
Grant, C. S. A. (338). In order to prevent a Federal
.flank movement to the left, from an extension northward
of the skirmish line of the 7th Connecticut, the 64th
Georgia and the two companies of the 32nd Georgia, were
soon formed on the left of the 28th, to the north of the
railroad, and the 6th Georgia was shifted still further to
the left. Colonel Smith was instructed to place his cavalry
regiments on the extreme flanks. This distribution constitutes the second position described by Grant. Colquitt
at this point ordered (343) an advance of his line in the
face of a Federal unit, probably still the 7th Connecticut
rather than the 7th New Hampshire. This movement
probably determined his request for reinforcements.
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The field upon which the action was then developing is a somewhat circular tract of firm, level and even
ground, covered at that time by virgin pine, and stated
to have been devoid of undergrowth. North of the railroad it has a north-south diameter of about two-thirds
of a mile, being limited to the north and west by a continuous dense swampy bay. Small isolated bays are scattered to the east and south. In the northern portion, a
field had been cleared, where the fighting later was very
severe.
The southeastern portion is traversed in a northeast-southwest direction by the railroad, the course of
which curves due west near the western margin. The
then road from Barbers to Olustee (Jacksonville-Lake
City) entered the tract north of the railroad, at about the
middle of the eastern side, to traverse it diagonally to
the southwest, again crossing to the south of the railroad
near its western border. It lies about two to three miles
east of the village of Olustee, from which it is separa.ted
not only by the large bay mentioned as lying to the west.ward of the battlefield, but also by another extended
narrow swamp to the eastward of the village, which
arises close to Ocean Pond and stretches southwestwardly south of the village. This extended swamp was pierced
by a causewayed clearing made for the transit of the
railroad and the road. It lay beyond the entrenched lines
Grant was constructing under Finegan’s orders to the
north and east of the village. Statements that the Confederate forces on the field were protected by entrenchments, made by various persons in the Federal force,
appear to be without foundation. The Confederates were
doubtless more familiar with the characteristics of the
terrain than were their opponents, who except for the
reconnaissance to Lake City made a few days before by
Henry’s force, had not been in the area. The terrain
on the whole was then favorable for the maneuvering of
troops, provided they did not become entangled in the
bays, but owing to the limited dimensions when occupied
by the infantry, did not provide sufficient space for the
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operations of cavalry. The Confedera.te units in general
appear to have taken greater advantage of the shelter
afforded by the trees than did many of their Federal adversaries. That the action developed on this site, rather
than before the village, was fortuitous and unpremeditated, while the field itself did not afford significant advantage to either side.
Seymour had ordered the reserve companies of the
7th Connecticut to join the others on the skirmish line,
and endeavour to secure the battery (Gamble’s). The
iine thus extended was from 300 to 400 ya.rds long, being
projected considerably to the north of the railroad in an
effort to counteract a Copfederate massing (the left shift
noted) on their rigJnt. Having advanced from 200 to 300
yards, the Confederates were found drawn -up in line in
a. position to support their battery. Employing a heavy
fire from their Spencer rifles (seven-shooters), the 7th
Connecticut advanced still further, perhaps nearly to
whe’re the road first crossed the railroad to the east of
Olustee, some of the Confederate line (probably the 64th
Georgia) giving ground. They were soon under a heavy cross fire, from their center having advanced farther
than their flanks, when, discovering that their ammuni-.
t.ion was getting low, and no support in sight, Captain
Skinner, in command, withdrew about 400 yards, and
parted his force right and left to unmask the 7th New
Hampshire, which advanced to take a. position variously
stated to have been on both sides of the road (Moore, d)
or with their left near the pond (304). Ammunition not
being immediately available, the 7th Connecticut withdrew to the rear.
In the meantime, Finegan, having decided within
an hour after Colquitt went forward, to engage the Federal force if not in too great strength, ordered both brigades to the front. While they were under way, a request
was received from Colquitt for reinforcements and more
ammunition.
With the arrival of reinforcements, Colquitt extended his line to the left in time to forestall a Federa
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attempt a.t a flanking movement on the Confederate left,
which failed from a lack of knowledge of the ground, as
they became entangled in the large bay and were forced
to retire. This may.have been the effort of the 7th New
Hampshire to form in line. The 19th Georgia was moved
to the north of the railroad, while the 6th Florida Battalion was formed on the right (south of the railroad),
and posted so as to enfilade the Federal left flank. The
23rd Georgia was placed on the left of the 64th. On Colonel Harrison’s arrival, with the Second Brigade, the
32nd and 1st Georgia Regulars took position on the left,
between the 23rd and 6th Regiments, the latter being
shifted to the extreme left, Colonel Harrison was placed
in charge of the left of the line, the whole of which extended the greater part of a mile in a north-south direct.ion. Gamble’s Battery, which had been moved to the
center of the extended line, becoming disabled, the Chatham Artillery, originally to their right, was brought to
the center to relieve Gamble’s, and advanced with the
infantry during the action. With the line thus extended,
another advance was ordered, and the Federal line was
driven back, the Confederate. line moving beyond the
first position of the Federal line. This is the third position of Grant, and probably marks the giving of ground
by the New York Regiments of Barton’s Brigade.
When the 7th Connecticut began to fall back, General Seymour advanced the remaining regiments of Hawley’s Brigade, but owing to confusion consequent to a
misunderstanding of orders while the 7th New Hampshire was forming in line under fire to support Hamilton’s Battery on the left, their line almost completely
broke. The regiment had been armed with Spencers, but
for some reason, shortly before the battle, a half had been
obliged to trade arms with the 40th Massachusetts, receiving Springfields, many of which were in bad order
(Little). Fragments of the regiment were shortly rallied
on the right of the field but the disorganized group did
not thereafter play a conspicuous part in the battle. The
remaining regiment of this brigade, the 8th U. S. Colored,
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had been advanced along the railroad until within 1,000
yards of the Confederate line and moved into a position
north of the railroad on the left of the line. The regiment
was composed of green troops without battle experience,
some coming onto the field with empty guns. Through
an unfortunate maneuver in an effort to make contact between their right and the left of the 7th Connecticut,
then again in action, Hamilton’s Battery was temporarily
left unsupported, but the 8th soon regained its supporting position. They were quickly exposed to a hot fire
on their left flank, evidently from the 6th Florida, and
were slowly giving ground, when Colonel Fribley was
killed. Command devolved on Captain Bailey, who, on a
threat of a thrust from the Confederate right, withdrew
them by the right flank to the rear of the 54th Massachusetts (Colored) near the closing phase of the battle.
Here they remained until the retreat commenced. During
their withdrawal a stand of colors was lost. Hamilton’s
Battery of this brigade occupied a position in the center
but to the left and in advance of Elder’s Battery and was
left exposed by the withdrawal of the Sth, necessitating
abandonment of the position. Two pieces could not be
withdrawn and were lost.
Barton’s Brigade was either on the right or second
in the general column during the march and was ordered
to advance about 20 minutes after firing began. Barton
t.hrew his regiments out to the right and left, and moved
forward in three parallel lines (e+z echelon, Moore, a).
However his force was halted and not brought into action until after the rout of the 7th New Hampshire, where
his left occupied the position the 7th had just vacated.
The 47th New York was on the left, the 48th New York
in the center on either side of Hamilton’s Battery, and
the 115th New York on the right, the end of its line behind a fence in the rear of a small cabin. A flanking
movement by the 6th and 32nd Georgia on the Confederate left soon subjected Barton’s Brigade to an intense
and galling fire, and it was compelled to slowly and stubbornly give ground. Langdon’s Battery, attached to the
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brigade, had been divided. One section was stationed to
the left and rear of Elder’s Battery, apparently to the
rear of the position which had been occupied by the 8th
U. S. Colored. These two pieces could not be withdrawn
and were captured by a charge of the 19th and 28th
Georgia. The other section which had been sent to the
right, also lost one piece.
Confusion incidental to the withdrawal of the 7th
New Hampshire, had delayed the reformation of the
men of the 7th Connecticut, but with replenishment of
their supply of ammunition, they were sent forward as
already mentioned, to close a gap between the left of
Barton’s Brigade, then yielding further ground, and the
right of the 8th U. S.
The regiments of Montgomery’s Brigade, which had
formed the rear of the line of march, did not get on the
field until relatively late, as they were halted at the crossing with the wagon train during the early part of the
action. When the New York regiments began to yield
with the exhaustion of their ammunition, the 54th Massachusetts (Colored) was brought up two miles on the
double quick, the men abandoning their heavy accouterments on the way, and formed into line between the road
and railroad. They advanced 200 yards through a bay to
the position on the left of Barton which the 8th U. S.
had occupied, and temporarily drove the advancing Confederates from some guns which had been abandoned
by a Federal battery. Many jarred charges home rather
than by using ramrods. By maintaining a brisk fire they
discharged 20,000 cartridges, and were withdrawn in
order by Lieut. Col. Hooper after the other Federal regiments had left the field and reformed to the right of the
road. This appears to have been the point, according to
Wheaton (Jones, 1867), when the Confederate line could
barely be held, and their right was forced back. About
the same time the 1st North Carolina (Colored) was
brought up between the 47th and 48th New York on the
double quick, and Barton’s Brigade, after two and one
half hours of action, was withdrawn, The stubborn resist-
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ante of these colored regiments, in the opinion of the
correspondents, prevented a rout of the Federal force.
Threats of the Confederate cavalry to the Federal left
were successfully parried by Henry.
About the time of the appearance of the regiments
of Montgomery’s Brigade, small arms ammunition of the
Confederates ran low as, from the absence of ammunition
wagons, they were depending on a railway flat car for
its transport. For about half an hour the Confederate
fire was slack, their line maintaining its position through
an intensification of artillery fire, as Guerard’s Battery
had come in to the left of the Chatham unit. With the
arrival of the ammunition car, the Confederate reserves
also arrived on the field. These consisted of Bonaud’s
Battalion, the 27th Georgia, and the 1st Florida Battalion’ which were put out in advance of the center of
the line as skirmishers in order to hold the Federal force
in check until distribution of ammunition to the other
Confederate units was effected. On the resumption of
intensified direct and enfilading fire the whole Federal
line, with the exception of the position of the 54th Massachusetts, softened. This constitutes the closing phase
of the battle, the fourth position described by Grant.
During the respite occasioned by the Confederate
ammunition shortage, between six and seven o ‘clock, Seymour gave the order to retire. Directed by Barton, retirement was effected by alternate battalions with frequent halts to exchange position under cover afforded
by the 7th Connecticut deployed as skirmishers, wh.o in
turn were covered by Henry’s Mounted Brigade. It was
slowly effected due to the confusion arising from the
mixing of the broken units. At the site of the field hospital east ‘of the stream, some degree of confusion was
overcome.
In summarization, it may be said tha.t the appearance of the entire Confederate force in the field, and the
‘subjection of the left of the Federal line to a stiff enfilading fire from the 6th Florida Battalion, wa.s responsible for the breaking of the 7th New Hampshire
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and the 8th U. S. regiments of the Federal force, permitting the Confederates to advance about a quarter of
a mile, thus giving the offensive to Colquitt. Although
the Federal resistance stiffened with the appearance of
Barton’s Brigade in the line, the steady pressure from
the entire Confederate force obliged the Federal line to
withdraw still further leaving, as noted, five pieces of
artillery. At this stage the appearance of the 54th Massachusetts and the 1st North Carolina stiffened the resistance and prevented a rout. A statement by Barton (302)
that the Federal adversaries formed three distinct lines
of battle against them, finally attacking in close column
by division, confirms the four stages described by Grant.
R ETREAT AND P URSUIT

Up to this point., the reports from both sides have
been in substantial agreement. Colquitt’s statement (344)
that the Federal force gave way in confusion on his final
advance, the pursuit continuing for several miles, and
Harrison’s (350) declaration that the Federal retreat,
at first sullen, became precipitous, the force being driven
for some miles until halted by Colquitt’s order, is in
distinct disagreement with the accounts of a relatively
orderly withdrawal as described by Seymour (289) and
Ba.rton (302). Although instructions had been given to
the Confederate cavalry to pursue and harry the retreating Federal force, these efforts appear to have been of
short duration, and productive of no more than 150 prisoners, presumably wounded. As a consequence, the commanding officer of the cavalry was subjected to severe
criticism and was threatened with an investigation. It
is probable that the Confederate infantry at any rate
were in no shape to pursue a retreating enemy after
dark, and had acquired a respect for their adversaries,
a.s witness the cautious character of Finegan’s later advance.
The Federal retreat continued throughout the night
under the immediate command of Colonel Barton, in general following the manner of withdrawal from the field
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previously described. At Sanderson, where 1,000 refugees, mainly wounded, were encountered, there was a
brief halt for organization, after which the 7th New
Hampshire and the 8th U. S. were marched by the left
flank of the wagons and ambulances to Barbers, which
was reached at midnight, where the force bivouaced, after
having marched 20 miles twice and fought for 5 hours
in one day. The 7th Connecticut, with the mounted force,
continued to serve as rearguard. Barbers was left on the
morning of the 2% The 7th Connecticut and the mounted
force remained in Baldwin until the 22nd, to cover the
retreat of the other units to Jacksonville.
Despite the haste of the retreat, time was evidently
taken to damage the railroad, as Finegan reported (327)
on the 22nd, that he found three quarters of a mile of
track at Sanderson destroyed and the iron burned.
As already mentioned, the Federal force lost five
field pieces to the Confederates. The latter, in addition,
also picked up from the field, 1,600 stand of small arms.
Two of the 12 pounders (Napoleons) captured from
Langdon’s Battery were assigned to the Chatham Artillery, to be finally surrendered in April 1865 at Greensboro, N. C. (Jones, 1867).
Although not harrying the retreating Federal force
after the battle, Finegan cautiously extended his force
eastward as soon as reconnoitering showed progress was
justified. He reported from Sanderson on the 23rd that
on the previous day it was found that the Federal position at Barbers was abandoned, and that his cavalry was
moving t,owards Baldwin. He planned to occupy Barbers
with his infantry t.hat day, as he had been delayed by
effecting repairs to the railroad (327). He occupied Baldwin on the 24th and was able to recover considerable
ammunition from which balls could be salvaged. He came
up to the west side of &Girt’s creek, twelve miles west
of Jacksonville, on the 26th, where his advance was halted by order of General Gardner, to whom command had
been given. The encampment established at this place
was known as Camp Milton, which later, under direction
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of General Anderson, was heavily fortified. These fortifications were destroyed by a Federal raid on the night
of May 31st.
C ASUALTIES

The casualties later reported by both sides after the
action are summarized below :
Federal
Confederate
officers men total
officers men total
killed
11 192 203
7
86
93
wounded
42 1110 1.152
798 847
49
missing
2
504 506
0
6
6
total
55 1806 1861
890
56
946
In 1867 or 1868 the remains of the Federal soldiers
buried at Olustee were exhumed and taken to the National Cemetery at Beaufort, S. C. for reinterment (Emilio).3
The chief medical officer of the Federal force, Surgeon Adolph Majer, relates (288) that a-t the beginning
of the action he had his twelve ambulances drawn up in
a pine clump 200 yards in the rear of the left but owing
to exposure to intense fire he withdrew one mile to set
3. &-. Curtis W. Spence, Superintendent of the Beaufort National
Cemetery, strangely states that his office has no record of the
burial in that cemetery, of any bodies removed from the field at
Olustee. Although there are 4600 unknown officers and soldiers
buried in that cemetery, none of these remains are stated to have
been removed from Olustee. There are numerous burials of men
from the Federal regiments concerned, all of which, with eleven
exceptions, are prior to February 1864. XII the latter instances, the
dates of death do not correspond to the date of the battle. Burial
of the Federal dead was left to the Confederates, and owing to lack
of specific means of identification and recording, it is reasonably
certain that most bodies were unknown at the time of burial, and
positive that all or practically all were in the unknown category
at the time exhumation was effected. A possible exception is that
of Colonel Fribley, whose family is stated to have erected a monument over his grave at the close of the war. The site and memory
of this monument is unknown tQ present day residents in the vicinity, and it is presumed that at the time of the general exhumation,
his remains and the monument were also removed, presumably to
his home, as his burial is not of record at Beaufort.
In the Oak Lawn Cemetery in Lake City, there are 150 burials
of Confederate dead, all, with one exception, of unknown. All are
credited to the field of Olustee. This number greatly exceeds the
admitted Confederate losses in killed after the battle.
At the present there are no known burials on the battlefield
of soldiers of either side.
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up his field hospital in a position behind a small stream.
He states that at the retreat 40 gravely wounded were
left at the ambulance station in charge of Assistant Surgeon Devendorf, and twenty-three more of the same class
were left at Sanderson, while 860 were forwarded to
Jacksonville. Most of the wounded were transported to
Baldwin and on into Jacksonville by ambulances, wagons,
and railroad cars, and eighty more were provided with
mounts by dismounting two companies of cavalry. Seven
horse drawn flat cars were available on Sunday for the
transportation of wounded from the vicinity of Baldwin,
while on Monday the tractive power of the freshly repaired locomotive was for a short time available to complete the evacuation. However the locomotive blew a flue,
and ropes were attached to it and the cars, which were
pulled from Ten-mile station to Camp Finegan by the
men of the 54th Massachusetts (Emilio). Finegan reported (321) that the road for three miles was strewn
with dead and wounded. Dr. Najer stated that the wounds
were mainly of the lower extremities, and that the majority were not severe, expecting that fully 500 or more
would be ready for duty in less than four weeks. Surgeon
Gross (2-26) reported that there were only two cap&l
operations on the field.
Seymour advised Turner after the battle that he
had information that twelve cars loaded exclusively with
Confederate wounded were brought to Lake City and
on the following day seven, and subsequently eight additional cars. A passenger car was estimated to have
carried sixty, and the freight and flat cars 40 each. The
captured Federal wounded who could be safely moved
were taken to Tallahassee, the remainder being left in
Lake City where, he was told, the citizens showed them
every kindness.
The later Confederate survey of casualties was, according to Finegan (328) on the 23rd, higher than at first
supposed,.as his first report did not admit of more than
a 250 loss. On that date he put the list of wounded at
from 600 to 700, most of whom would be fit for duty in
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a few weeks, having but slight flesh wounds. Grant said
that a large number of Confederates were wounded on
the arms and hands, which he attributed to their use of
cover. Finegan relates having 150 wounded prisoners, of
whom three were Negroes. He further stated that on the
morning of the 22nd ambulances were still engaged in
removing wounded from the field.
On the 23rd Seymour, through a flag, proposed
(329) to Finegan the parole of the wounded prisoners
in Confederate hands, to which Finegan replied that,
properly cared for, they had been sent forward to await
any further action of the government.4
It is believed that the Federal figures for killed and
wounded were actually greater than those above given,
as the 506 reported as missing, must have largely fallen
in either of the foregoing categories.
Actually, the action was contemporaneously regarded as one of the hottest of the Civil War. On the Confederate side casualties included nearly twenty per cent of
the force engaged, on the Federal nearly forty per cent.
S IDE L IGHTS

The victory produced general jubilation over the
south, and General Finegan received a vote of thanks
from the Confederate Congress. Seymour was not only
acidly criticized by his own troops but by the northern
press as well.
Confederate leaders were greatly disappointed that
the pursuit of the retreating Federals was not undertaken with greater zeal. It will be recalled that General
Beauregard had contemplated assigning an experienced
line officer to command the force being assembled at
Lake City. Brigadier General Gardner, commanding in
Middle Florida, evidently outranked Finegan, and Beauregard later stated (326) that not knowing Gardner was
back on duty following an operation, he sent Brigadier
General Taliaferro to assume command, but later learn4. It is likely that surviving prisoners were finally sent to the milibrp
prison at Andersonville, Georgia.
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ing Gardner was actua.lly at Lake City, he directed him
to assume command until Taliaferro should arrive and
organize a vigorous offensive. Under the impression that
Gardner played an active part in the battle, he was instructed to organize the Confederate force in divisions,
and assign one to Taliaferro. In the meantime, however,
the Confederate War Department had assigned Major
General J. Patton Anderson to command the forces in
F’lorida. It was Finegan’s good luck or good judgment,
either or both, which lead him to assign a.ctive command
on the battle field to Colquitt, as one may suspect that
Colquitt’s a.biIities and experience had much to do with
the outcome, yet there was glory sufficient for both.
Gardner’s adjutant wrote Finegan from Tallahassee
on the 22nd communicating news of Gardner’s interim
appointment and informing him that the brigadier general commanding, through motives of courtesy and feelings of delicacy, did not desire to interfere further than
to stop offensive movements until reinforcements now
under way arrive, and stated that he directs you to take
a strong position on the St. Marys. Finegan related on
the 27th that he never received this communication. On
the 23rd, Gardner again wrote Finegan, informing him
that interim command of the East Florida forces ha.d
been given to him, and that for the time being, Finegan.
should only act on the defensive. To this Finegan replied
on the 24th, expressing willingness to serve under any
general officer assigned by the commanding general, but.
flatly declaring his intention to retain command until
the relieving general arrives in the field (336). He wrote
Jordan on the 25th that the interest of the service requires he should retain command until his successor a.r-rives (327). Gardner finally came into the field, and halted Finegan’s advance at McGirt’s creek on February
26th. In an endorsement he made on March 7 to Finegan’s report on the ba.ttle, among other reasons given
for calling halt, he stated “especially beca.use of my utter
want of confidence in the brigadier commanding to,
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ha.ndle an army in the field of battle, as manifested under
my own e.ye at the battle of Olustee.”
General Beauregard arrived at the encampment
(Camp Milton) on McGirt’s creek on March 2nd, and
General Anderson arrived the day after. There they
found 8,000 effectives of all arms. In view of the strong
position occupied by the Federal force, he decided not to
assault the place, as Cooper had ordered on March 4th.
Beauregard organized the Confederate infantry into
three brigades, assigned to Generals Finegan and Colquitt, and Colonel Harrison, with separate brigades of
cavalry (Colonel Robt. H. Anderson) and artillery
(Lie&. Col. Charles C. Jones) (324). On assuming command of the District of Florida, Anderson created two
subdistricts, assigning that west of the Suwanee to General Gardner, to the east to General Finega.n. This appears to be a complete vindication for Finegan.
A

F T E R M A T H

Although considerable reinforcements had reached
both sides in Florida subsequent to the battle of the 20th,
the situation, despite the brief Federal occupation of
Palatka, became essentially a stalemate, largely due to
the diversion of Federal attention to operations developing elsewhere. Seymour was advised as early as February 27, that the forces in Florida would be reduced as
soon as Jacksonville was secure. Nevertheless in March
Seymour was proposing further offensive operations in
Florida to his superiors in the Department of the South
(2-22). In the middle of April five of the regiments which
had participated in the Olustee campaign, the 7th Connecticut, 7th New Hampshire, and the 47th, 48th and
115th New York, were withdrawn to Hilton Head, and a
few days later were on their way to Fortress Monroe.
On March 24, Seymour received orders to turn over his
command to Brigadier General J. P. Hatch. In April he
asked for relief from duty in the Department of the
South, and shortly a.fter was given an assignment in Virginia. There he had the misfortune to become a Confed-
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erate prisoner, and on June 13th, in company of other
captured generals, was sent to Charleston for .safekeeping. In the middle of April, Beauregard also asked Anderson to release, as soon as possible, the troops which had
been sent to Florida. On May 16th, Anderson was instructed to form his infantry into one brigade, which
was to be placed in command of General Finegan and
sent to Richmond, where they passed to the front on June
1. Thus most of the surviving actors in the tragedy of
Olustee soon passed from the Florida stage.
A PPRAISAL

Although the Battle of Olustee was a clear-cut Confederate victory, and may have frustrated some, at least,
of the nebulous plans for Florida .the %ederal government entertained, nevertheless it did not appreciably
affect the course of the war. However failure to reeonstruct a “loyal” government in the state, may have, in
Lincoln’s sight, been offset by the presence of a full
Florida delegation in the Republican convention during
the summer.
As already pointed out, the field on which the Battle
of Olustee was unexpectedly fought afforded no substantial advantage to either antagonist, without the benefit of any previously prepared works for defense. Notwithstanding, Seymour accepted the field selected by his
opponent, who enjoyed whatever slight advantages the
terrain afforded. As has not infrequently been the case,
the opposing commanders believed they faced a numericdly superior enemy, when as a matter of fact, they were
fairly evenly matched. What may have supported this
opinion in Seymour’s mind, was the circumstances that
once it became apparent that the battle was joined, the
entire Confederate force was quickly brought upon the
field in a fresh condition, while Seymour’s columns,
fatigued from a long march, were successively brought
onto the field as individual brigades, and consequently
for a great part of the action, each in fact faced a numeri
tally superior opponent. This affords justification for
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Gillmore’s later statement that the component parts of.
Seymour’s force were beaten in detail. The cavalry on
either side made no contribution to the outcome other
than maneuvering on the flanks, and it does not appear
that artillery fire contributed materially, as the fire on
both sides, later judging from the marks on the trees,
was entirely too high. However the fall of one pine,
toppled by a solid shot, appears to have contributed to
the disorganization of the 8th U. S. (Jones, 1867). Exception may be made to the Confederate employment of
a heavy rifle mounted on a railway flat car, which fired
grape and canister, which was, according to Federal
sources, quite effective. (Moore, a, c, d). It is stated that
the noise of its discharge dominated all other battle
sounds (Emilio). Sound of the cannonading was heard
as far away as Barbers and Baldwin (Emilio ; Roe). The
a.ction was essentially an engagement at small arms,
and all participants agree that a hot fire was maintained,
except in those intervals when units had exhausted their
ammunition, and were awaiting a fresh supply. Both
sides appear to have had adequate supplies, but one gains
the impression that the Confederates made greater effort
to bring up their supplies quickly. It also appea.rs that
the Confederate troops may have more generally taken
advantage of such cover, notably tree trunks, which the
terrain afforded, and generally fired with greater deliberation and accuracy.
When the reconnaissance was made on Lake City
on the Ilth, Seymour probably could have achieved the
Suwanee river objective with little trouble had the bulk
of his force been closely behind the mounted brigade, as
FinegarY’s available force was much inferior. The time
he spent in indecision was sufficient for Beaurega.rd to
reinforce Finegan adequately. Seymour also appears to
have erred in having the 8th U. S., a green regiment
never previously under fire, plac.ed in the front line at
the beginning of the enga.gement. Of his entire force,
Seymour placed the greatest confidence in the 7th Connecticut, a skeleton regiment which was engaged throughPublished by STARS, 1950
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out the entire action, given most of the dirty assignments,
and never let him down. The New York regiments, under
Barton, appear to have given an excellent account of
themselves.
The Confederate infantry gave a good account of
itself. No regiment did more than give a little ground
in the face of a hot fire, and none withdrew from, or left,
an assigned place in the line. It is likely that all of the
Georgia regiments at any rate, were seasoned troops,
and could take as well as give. Any special mention which
is made of Florida units should not be construed as disparagement of the Georgia regiments. The L,eon Light
Artillery under Major Gamble, continued in action until
disabled, occupying a position in the center of the field.
The enfila.ding fire of the 6th Florida Battalion on the
right, probably contributed materially to the disruption
of the 7th New Hampshire and the 8th U. S. Regiments
on the Federal left, the failure of which wa.s the turning
point of the battle.
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